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Discourses of conflict and collaboration and institutional context in 1 
the implementation of forest conservation policies in Soria, Spain 2 
Mireia Pecurul-Botines1, Monica Di Gregorio, Jouni Paavola 3 
Abstract 4 
This article examines the emergence of conflict and collaboration in the implementation of forest 5 
conservation policies in Soria, Spain. We draw insights from discursive institutionalism and use a 6 
comparative case study approach to analyse and compare a situation of social conflict over the 7 
Natural Park declaration in the Sierra de Urbión, and a civil society led collaborative process to 8 
GHYHORSPDQDJHPHQWSODQVIRUWKH³6LHUUDGH&DEUHMDV´ LQ6RULD7KHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH(89 
Habitats Directive generated different outcomes in these two cases, which unfolded in the context 10 
of the same nature conservation legislation and national and provincial administrative structures 11 
but differed in terms of types of forests involved, property rights arrangements and forest use 12 
histories. We critically examine the influence of the institutional context and dominant discourses 13 
on the emergence of outcomes: Conflict emerged where local institutions and discourses were 14 
threatened by the EU directive, while collaboration was possible where local institutions and 15 
counter-discourses were weak. We find that the institutional context plays an important part in 16 
determining local discourses in the implementation of forest conservation policies. Yet local 17 
counter-discourses have limited influence in the implementation and policy processes in the face 18 
of contestation by the discourses of regional civil servants conservation activists. 19 
20 
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Introduction 1 
This article examines the implementation of the Habitats Directive (CD 92/43/EEC) and the Birds 2 
Directive (CD 79/409/EEC), which underlie the European network of protected areas called 3 
Natura 2000. Within the context of participatory processes linked to the implementation of Natura 4 
2000, we investigate the role of the institutional context and discourses in explaining distinct 5 
outcomes of conflict and collaboration in two localities in Spain.  6 
The first phase of implementation of Natura 2000 included the transposition of the Habitat 7 
Directive into national legislation and the designation of a network of protected areas by the 8 
member states. A second phase involved the development of management plans for the 9 
designed areas. Controversies emerged over site designation in many member states in the late 10 
1990s and early 2000s (Bjorkell, 2008; Hiedanpää, 2002; Krott et al., 2000; Paavola, 2003; 11 
Pinton, 2001; Rojas-Briales, 2000; Stoll-Kleemann, 2001; Wurzel, 2008). The controversies 12 
highlighted the importance of compensating land owners for adverse changes in their property 13 
rights, such as reduced access or management constraints (European  Commission, 2003). But 14 
as it would be difficult to compensate all landowners affected by Natura 2000 (Julien et al., 2000), 15 
the European Commission decided to promote participation as a tool for facilitating policy 16 
implementation (Europarc-españa, 2007; European Commission, 2005). 17 
Participation provides the physical and organisational spaces for dialogue, collaboration and 18 
policy change (Keough & Blahna, 2006). Collaborative planning in environmental decision-making 19 
makes use of participatory approaches particularly in situations where there are multiple actors 20 
with conflicting interests (Saarikoski, Raitio, & Barry, 2013). Conflict and collaboration might 21 
impact on the policy process, driving change in the broader institutional context (Raitio, 2012b). 22 
Studies at the EU and national level have explained how new discourses are brought into policy 23 
processes and are eventually institutionalized in policy arrangements and social practices (den 24 
Besten, Arts, & Verkooijen, 2013; Pistorius et al., 2012; Somorin et al., 2011). However, these 25 
studies do not contextualise discourses within their local institutional setting, and do not look at 26 
the local discourses. Yet, local actors can exert influence in institutionalization processes initiated 27 
at national or international level through discursive contestation resulting in either conflict or 28 
collaboration. This contributes by article investigating broader and local discourses in the 29 
implementation of EU conservation policies in two institutional settings and by providing new 30 
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empirical evidence on the implementation of conservation policies at the local level in Spain.  1 
In the first case study in Sierra de Urbión, local inhabitants and the local administration contested 2 
the designation of a new Natural Park. In the second case, in Sierra de Cabrejas, a bottom-up 3 
participatory process emerged to support and facilitate the enlargement of a protected area. We 4 
use discourse analysis to investigate how institutional factors affected discourses of forest 5 
conservation and planning in the two cases studies and then compare the two cases helps to 6 
shed light on their respective institutional conditions. 7 
Our results highlight how it is easier for new discourses and ideas regarding forest conservation 8 
to emerge when forest-related institutions such as property rights arrangements, governance 9 
structures, and forest management plans are weaker or less traditional. In these circumstances, 10 
rural development policies and other non-forestry sources FDQ LQIRUP DFWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV DQG11 
discourses.  We find that where enduring forest-related institutions prevail and dominate, they are 12 
likely to inform discursive struggles over forest conservation. Such conditions leave little room for 13 
new discourses and ideas to emerge and for institutional change to take place.  14 
In what follows, we will first outline the conceptual framework that informs our research and then 15 
introduce case studies and explain the methods we use to examine the emergence of conflict and 16 
collaboration. We then analyse the conflict in Sierra de Urbión, highlighting how the historical 17 
institutional context informs ORFDODFWRUV¶GLVFRXUVHVRQ forest conservation. Then we examine the 18 
emergence of collaboration in the form of participatory planning in Sierra de Cabrejas. In the 19 
discussion we summarise how the dominant discourses and the institutional context influence 20 
DFWRUV¶discourses, and relate our findings to the existing literature. We conclude by reflecting on 21 
the implementation of conservation policies and future research needs. 22 
Discursive Institutionalism, conflict and collaboration  23 
Discursive institutionalism is increasingly used in the field of forestry and conservation policy 24 
analysis to understand KRZDFWRUV¶ LGHDV become institutionalized (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Raitio, 25 
2012a; Rydin, 2003; Sotirov et al., 2012; Saarikoski et al., 2013). We employ the insights of 26 
discursive institutionalism to explore the emergence of conflict and collaboration in the 27 
implementation of conservation policies in Soria, Spain. 28 
Discursive institutionalism is a powerful approach for explaining policy outcomes because it 29 
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combines the analysis of structural aspects determined by pre-existing institutions with the more 1 
process oriented ideas and discursive practices of actors that shape the meaning of forest 2 
conservation plans. This dualism is explained in the discursive institutionalism literature as 3 
³FRQVWUDLQLQJVWUXFWXUHVDQGHQDbling constructs of meaning, which are internal to agents whose 4 
background ideational abilities explain how they create and maintain institutions at the same time 5 
WKDWWKHLUIRUHJURXQGGLVFXUVLYHDELOLWLHVHQDEOHWKHPWRFRPPXQLFDWHDQGFKDQJHWKHP´6FKPLdt 6 
2010). Discourses are translated into discursive practice through communicative processes within 7 
which actors form and exchange their ideas, often through contestation with others (den Besten, 8 
et al., 2013; Schmidt, 2010). Discourse analytical approaches are increasingly used to examine 9 
European forest and biodiversity policies (Leipold, 2014).   10 
Following the above line of thought, collaboration and conflict can be seen as resulting from 11 
processes of policy argumentation within a specific institutional context. Policy outcomes emerge 12 
from the interaction between the policy processes and their context (Cashore, et al., 2001; 13 
Saarikoski, et al., 2013). Few studies have examined the dynamics between local discourses and 14 
broader social structures in policy processes. Research often focuses on internal processes of 15 
conflict or collaboration instead of relating them to their wider institutional and cultural contexts 16 
(Hillier, 2003; Soini & Aakkula, 2007). For instance, Idrissou et al. (2011) acknowledge the role of 17 
institutions in participatory natural resources management. They conceptualize participation as 18 
interaction between frames, social cohesion and institutions, attributing successful natural 19 
resource management to social cohesion and effective informal institutions created in 20 
participatory processes. Yet, there is a need to understand how local institutions have informed 21 
the frames and discourses used in the collaborative process.  22 
Leach (2008) argues that there is a need for new analytical approaches that take seriously the 23 
human-ecological dynamics, history, path dependency, and the ways in which different people 24 
frame or construct problems. The historical context is important for understanding how institutions 25 
resist change, and how new institutions are built on existing ones (Leach et al., 1999; North, 26 
1990). Historical institutionalism uses WKHFRQFHSWRI ³SDWKGHSHQGHQF\´ (Hall & Taylor, 1996) to 27 
connect the past, present and future of institutional development. Its view of punctuated continuity 28 
of institutional development has been criticized for its emphasis on stability rather than change. 29 
Amalgamating key insights of discursive institutionalism can help to explain how ideas and 30 
agency influence institutional change and policy outcomes (Peters, et al., 2005).  31 
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Raitio (2012) suggests that forest planning involves a set of informal rules (such as an obligation 1 
of the public forest agency to provide economic benefits to the State as land owner as well as to 2 
the local economy) that reinforce formal rules regarding e.g. timber production, at times at the 3 
expense of other social obligations. In her study, institutional context reinforces the role of the 4 
forest agency as a timber producer rather than as a facilitator or broker between different forest-5 
related interests. Thus, despite talk about and investment in collaborative forest planning, 6 
prevailing practices reinforce existing institutional structures. In contrast, Hiedanpää (2005) 7 
assesses the collaborative planning for the regional Finnish forestry plans as a success. 8 
According to his interpretation, the regional forest planning process could be collaborative 9 
because it did not disturb the prevailing communal and regional institutions and because at the 10 
same time was open to environmental agencies¶ DQGDFWLYLVWV¶GLVFRXUVHV 11 
We apply the above described conceptual framework and insights to two case studies below by 12 
first identifying historical institutions which influence current local discourses on forest 13 
conservation. Then we contrast the local discourses with dominant discourses which might 14 
enable or constrain different policy outcomes, originating from for example regional public 15 
authorities and the Commision of the European Union. 16 
Case studies, materials and methods 17 
We combine discursive and historical institutional approaches in two case studies on the 18 
implementation of conservation policies in Soria, Spain. In the first case, a conflict emerged over 19 
the designation of a Natural Park in the Sierra de Urbión. In the second case, a collaborative 20 
participatory process emerged in a bottom-up way for the development of management plans for 21 
the Sierra de Cabrejas. The two cases were selected because they manifested different policy 22 
outcomes despite sharing many other important aspects. We seek to explain different policy 23 
outcomes using the logic of case comparison. 24 
The province of Soria lies in the North-East of the Castille and Leon Autonomous Community. 25 
Forest covers about 58 % or 600 000 hectares of the province (Lucas Santolaya, 2000). The 26 
north-western part is covered by conifer forests although there are also scattered stands of mixed 27 
and hardwood trees (Segur, 2007). There is a long history of forest exploitation and conservation 28 
in the upper region of Soria - la Sierra de Urbión. Lagoon ecosystems and surrounding forests 29 
are protected under the Natura 2000, the Plan de Ordenación de Recursos Naturales (PORN) 30 
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[Natural Resources Management Plan] and Natural Park designation. It was the designation of a 1 
Natural Park in 2010 that sparked the conflict in the Sierra de Urbión. 2 
In the South of Soria, la Sierra de Cabrejas is covered by Spanish juniper forest, the largest of its 3 
kind in Europe. In 2006, 32 000 hectares of la Sierra de Cabrejas were included into Natura 2000. 4 
Earlier only 263 hectares of the juniper forest were protected. Local Action Groups (LAGs are 5 
associations of municipalities) and regional administration produced a management plan for the 6 
Natura 2000 site in a participatory process. The LGAs were originally formed for the 7 
implementation of the European rural development plans. What makes the case of la Sierra de 8 
Cabrejas unique is that the development of management plans was not lead by the regional 9 
administration but by LAGs. Sierra de Cabrejas differs from the Sierra de Urbión because of the 10 
IRUPHU¶Vlower population density and history of forest abandonment.  11 
The two cases share some important institutional characteristics, including being governed by the 12 
same nature conservation legislation and the same national and provincial administrations. But 13 
there are also important differences related to types of prevailing forests, property rights and 14 
forest use histories. These diverse conditions enable us to examine differences in argumentative 15 
processes about conservation policies and their interaction with the institutional and discursive 16 
contexts. A comparison of the two cases helps to explain conflict and collaboration as policy 17 
outcomes. 18 
Fieldwork in the case study communities was undertaken over a three-month period from May 19 
2009 to September 2009. It included the collection documentary material, qualitative interviews 20 
and keeping a field diary. Documentary material such as media coverage and policy documents 21 
was analysed to discern socially embedded rules and formal bureaucratic institutions (Cleaver, 22 
2000). This distinction allowed us to consider cross-level regulatory arrangements from local 23 
ordinances to forest management plans and European directives, and to analyse how these 24 
institutions inform the frames and ideas that actors used as discursive devices. We interviewed 25 
32 representatives of: i) local administration and villagers affected by protected areas (n = 17), ii) 26 
regional civil servants responsible of the implementation of conservation policies (n = 7); and; iii) 27 
conservation activists, academics and environmental consultants (n = 8). 28 
The first group of actors includes inhabitants that have been exposed to the present institutional 29 
context. In their discourses they often mentioned facts related to the history of the site. Our task 30 
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has been to investigate the links between these facts and their discourses on conservation and 1 
forest management. The second group includes civil servants working at the Protected Areas 2 
Department. This service operates under the General Directorate of Natural Environment of 3 
Castille and Leon. Technical assistance is, however, devolved to the Territorial Services. There is 4 
one Territorial Service for each of the nice provinces in Castille and León. Soria is one of these 5 
SURYLQFHV ,Q 6RULD¶V 7HUULWRULDO 6HUYLFH TXDOLILHG WHFKQLFDO VWDII FRRUGLQDWHV IRUHVW FRQVHUYDWLRQ6 
and management planning ( Figure 1). 7 
 8 
 9 
Figure 1: Environment department structure in Castile and León. (Junta de Castilla y León. 10 
Consejería de Medio Ambiente, 2007)  11 
 12 
Finally, the third group includes conservationist, academics and consultants. Their discourse is 13 
institutionalized in the Habitats Directive and EU conservation policy mode widely. In order to 14 
analyse this discourse, we also examined EU conservation policy documents in addition to 15 
conducting interviews with actors belonging to the group. 16 
Open-ended questions were used to enable the respondents to express how they understood the 17 
conservation of forests and how they construe their own identity with respect to the natural 18 
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environment (Fischer & Marshall, 2010; Buijs, et al., 2011). Material collection was undertaken in 1 
several stages, starting with exploratory interviews and following with the collection and analysis 2 
of documentary material and the bulk of in-depth interviews. Initial interviewees were selected 3 
from the lists of participants of policy and other meetings to do with the implementation of 4 
conservation policies. Later interviewees were asked to name further potential participants 5 
(snowballing). All interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. Open coding on the 6 
transcripts provided the basis for the discourse analysis. Discourse analysis focused on four main 7 
WKHPHVDFWRUV¶ LQWHUHVWVDQGVWUDWHJLHVGLVFRXUVHVRQQDWXUHFRQVHUYDWLRQGLVFRXUVHVRQWKHLU8 
environment; and, how actors understood governance of the above-mentioned environment, and 9 
their role in their general picture.  10 
The conflict in the Natural Park of the Sierra de Urbión  11 
In Sierra de Urbión, forests have traditionally provided subsistence and income. In the last 12 
century, the role of forests underpinned complex relations between the local communities and the 13 
state, which created tensions between levels of governance and can still spark conflicts. In what 14 
follows, we will first discuss how actors frame the conflict over the designation of the Natural 15 
Park, then describe the relevant past and current institutions and in the end explain how the 16 
institutions are related to DFWRUV¶discourses in the conflict. 17 
In June 2009, the inhabitants of the village of Covaleda in Sierra de Urbión were polled over the 18 
potential designation of 2,200 hectares of forest as a Natural Park. About half of the people, 848 19 
out of 1,678 inhabitants participated in the poll (La Voz de Pinares [local newspaper], 31 July 20 
2009). The villagers opposed the designation of the Natural Park by a small majority of only 25 21 
votes. The forest was designated as a natural park in February 2010 despite public opposition.  22 
In order to analyse how the conflict has been framed, we examined views expressed in a public 23 
hearing organized by the head of the Territorial Services in Soria to clarify the controversy over 24 
the Natural Park in February 2008 (e.g.: La Voz de Pinares, 11 February 2008) and in public 25 
debates to which town council representatives for the environment where summoned to explain 26 
the advantages and disadvantages of the Natural Park on the eve of the poll held on the 25th of 27 
July of 2009. Furthermore, other views regarding the designation of the Natural Park were 28 
collected from local press texts.  29 
The conflict over the Natural Park declaration has been framed in economic and property rights 30 
terms. Discourses in favour of the declaration emphasised economic opportunities associated 31 
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with the park, whereas discourses against it were at odds with the constraints to forest access 1 
and decision-making rights. In contrast, Natural Park supporters made an effort to separate the 2 
discussion on decision-making rights and forest ownership from the debate on forest 3 
conservation. For example, some local and regional public authorities highlighted that ³UHJDUGOHVV4 
RIWKHUHVXOWRIWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQSURSHUW\ULJKWVZLOOQRWFKDQJH´ 5 
The village of Covaleda made a formal complaint about the conflict between local and regional 6 
competences regarding the Natural Park to the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal (La Voz de 7 
Pinares, 8 October 2010). Through this complaint, the village of Covaleda sought recognition of 8 
its legal right to manage land within the boundaries of the Natural Park in its jurisdiction. The then 9 
Mayor of Covaleda assessed the situation as follows: 10 
7KH\ ZDQW WR PDNH D QDWXUDO SDUN E\ ODZ  DQG WKDW
V ZKDW LV JRRG  ZH¶YH KDG11 
FRQVXOWDWLRQV,GRQ¶WNQRZLI\RXZHUHDZDUHEXW,PDGHWKHvillager GHFLGHEHFDXVHLW¶V12 
clear that the mayor can often be wrong when making a decision, so I left the 13 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ « DERXW ZKHWKHU WR « EH SDUW RI WKH SDUN RU QRW WR WKH villagers« WKH14 
concept that they have of their forest is as their property ... and in the end it turned out 15 
that local villagers did not want to belong to this park..." 16 
 Is the current conflict over the Natural Park just a reincarnation of older struggles around local 17 
control over the environment? What can history tell us about the role of institutions, such a forest 18 
ownership and the authority to make decisions on forest management in this conflict? In what 19 
follows, we will explore in more detail forest ownership and management and how these 20 
institutions are embedded in discursive practices on the conflict over the Natural Park designation 21 
in the Sierra de Urbión. 22 
The historical relationship of Covaleda villagers with forests is important for understanding the 23 
conflict over the Natural Park declaration. The designation mostly affects ³3XEOLF8WLOLW\)RUHVWV´ in 24 
the area. Public Utility Forests originate to the establishment of the Public Forest Service (PFS) 25 
and the expropriation [Desamortización] of Royal, clerical and municipal land by the State and its 26 
subsequent privatisation. PFS, a technocratic unit of professional forest engineers, succeeded in 27 
excluding Public Utility Forests from privatisation in 1855 because of the importance of timber and 28 
fuel wood as strategic resources (Marraco-Solana, 1991). PFS was given a formal role in the 29 
development of forest management plans for Public Utility Forests.  30 
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A century later, the regional level of Public Forestry Administration (PFA) is still responsible for 1 
the management of Public Utility Forests. Yet, most Public Utility Forests are still owned by local 2 
communities and managed under long-established local ordinances. The new layer of forest 3 
management involving PFS and later PFA was simply added on top of the older communal 4 
regime of forest management. Over time many villagers have adopted the technical jargon of 5 
those forest management plans. Furthermore, they associate forest conservation to forest 6 
management, which aims at maintaining the continued existence of forests by using the 7 
maximum sustainable yield criterion for harvesting decisions and by ensuring that forests are 8 
regenerated after harvesting. These similarities between discourses on forest conservation 9 
between civil servants and villagers in Sierra de Urbión reflect local attempts at gaining legitimacy 10 
in front of the public authorities regarding their competence to manage and protect the forests. As 11 
a result, the conflict is more about who has the right to manage the forest rather than how the 12 
forest should be managed.  Villagers¶ discourses on their ³ULJKW WRGHFLGH´ UHIHU to the past as 13 
HYLGHQFHWKDW³WKH\NQRZKRZWRPDQDJHWKHLUIRUHVW´ 14 
³We do not want to give away the decision making power RYHU WKH IRUHVW« WKDW ZH15 
FRQVLGHUDVRXUV«>«@WKH\VKRXOGWUDQVIHUPRUHWRWKHORFDOFLW\FRXQFLOVEHFDXVH«16 
tKH\KDYHGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKH\PDQDJHWKHLUIRUHVWVZHOO´Villager). 17 
In the study area, a Royal Decree of 1901 entitled villagers to harvest 1500-3500 units of timber 18 
depending on the size of their villages (Domínguez-Lerena, 2007; Kleinpenning, 1962). Income 19 
from forestry was particularly important after 1950, because poor soil fertility and frequent frosts 20 
meant agriculture was not a viable source of income. In the village of Covaleda, the value of each 21 
set of pines assigned to a family (approx. 30 m3) could reach the equivalent of 240 euros per 22 
annum in 1955-59, when the average annual salary was equivalent to 140 -180 Euros 23 
(Kleinpenning, 1962; p. 146). The local administration was responsible for apportioning timber 24 
among entitled inhabitants. However, a civil society organization, the local wood board, [junta de 25 
maderas], selected the trees to be harvested and sold them ( Lucas-Santolaya, 2000). Junta de 26 
maderas usually selected the best pine trees from the forest. Its practices were not always in line 27 
with the silvicultural practices approved by forest officers, which was a source of conflict between 28 
the villagers and forest authorities (Kleinpenning 1962:87). To sum up, local informal rules and 29 
formal rules for over a century have generated a current complex system of forest management 30 
and property rights (Table 1): 31 
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 1 
Legal rights in                
Public Utility forests 
Regional 
Administration 
Local 
Administration 
Local people or 
neighbours 
Ownership of the forests   X  
Forest management 
planning 
X   
Forest operations X X (X) 
Right to have an income 
from the forest harvesting 
X X X 
Right to organize the selling 
of the wood 
(X)  X 
Table 1: Complexity of governance of the Public Utility Forest in the site  2 
Although public administration has taken over forest management, local communities remain the 3 
legal owners of Public Utility Forests. The villagers as individuals are not legal owners of the 4 
forests, but they are entitled to a share of forest income through each set of pines assigned to a 5 
family. The local ordinances defined who is a local and who is not, and who is entitled to benefit 6 
from the forest and who is not, in an effort to exclude outsiders from the common forest and the 7 
social and political dynamics of the villages. The same logic XQGHUOLHV YLOODJHUV¶ GLVFRXUVHV on 8 
their right to manage the forest by drawing a boundary between the people who belong to the 9 
community and outsiders such as environmental activists, and therefore between those who can 10 
legitimately make decisions regarding the forest and those who cannot.  11 
³If the environmentalists came here to impose their views ... the same thing would 12 
happen as with the government: people would not « be so easily convinced. They can 13 
come and see, and give their opinion« >EXW@ we still think that we are the ones that 14 
VKRXOGPDQDJHWKHVHIRUHVWV1RWWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLVWVRUWKHJRYHUQPHQW´ (Villager) 15 
 In addition to being entitled to a share of forest income, the villagers had obligations and 16 
responsibilities to participate in communal work in the forests. Local communities also benefited 17 
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indirectly from publicly funded forest operations and regeneration after logging because villagers 1 
were employed in these activities. Property rights are associated with forest income and have 2 
substantial economic implications. However, property rights have also other socio-political 3 
dimensions which informed i) discourses on the above described past institutional struggles; and 4 
ii) YLOODJHUV¶GLVFRXUVHVRQWKHLUUHODWLRQZLWKIRUHVWVGXHWRsocial and work obligations tied to the 5 
entitlement to forest income.  6 
Past and present institutions are thus intimately related to the dependency of villagers on natural 7 
resources and to the 6WDWH¶Vdesire to maintain control over them. One local interviewee noted 8 
that ³tKH6WDWHKDVDOZD\VWULHGWRJHWWKLQJVIURPWKHSXEOLF«DQGZLWKIRUHVWVLWZDVYHU\HDV\´9 
(Villager). Villagers had already earlier framed the Law 08/1991 on the Protected Natural Areas of 10 
Castile and León as ³XVXUSDWLRQRIWKHLU IRUHVWV´ (Villager). Local discourses suggest that forest 11 
conservation policies were a threat to their right to decide on Sierra de Urbión: 12 
³These new natural parks have a problem: they are managed by the regional 13 
government, and so, the link is lost with the people who live in these areas... Because 14 
WKH\DUHQRWPDQDJLQJWKHP«LWVKRXOGEHPDGHFOHDU LQWKe statutes of these national 15 
areas and parks,  thDWWKHPDQDJHPHQWUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVVKRXOGEHVKDUHG«DQGWKDWWKH16 
rights of the villagers should be maintained... because if this area is to maintain its 17 
population it will be because of this.´Villager). 18 
The local discourses confront discourses of the civil servants in the Protected Areas Department 19 
and the General Directorate of Natural Environment of Castille and Leon. The regional 20 
administration uses technical and legalistic discourse to maintain control over decisions on 21 
forests and right to intervene despite local opposition. On the other hand, public resources 22 
invested in forests are seen by the regional administration and local villagers to guarantee the 23 
continued existence of the forest as well as to support local jobs. A public servant responsible for 24 
protected areas highlighted that the legal framework determines what is feasible and what is not, 25 
and the risk that participatory processes could raise false expectations. 26 
³,WKLQNZHVKRXOGFRQVLGHUWRZKDWH[WHQWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVILWZLWKWKHH[LVWLng structures, 27 
RU LI WKHVH FRXOG EH FKDQJHG« +RZHYHU UHJDUGLQJ FRPSHWHQFHV RU DGPLQLVWUDWLYH28 
VWUXFWXUHV WKLV LV D KXJH TXDOLWDWLYH OHDS« WKHUH PD\ EH WKLQJV WKDW DUH WRWDOO\29 
LPSRVVLEOH«DQGLW¶VYHU\ LPSRUWDQWWRKDYHWKLVIUDPHZRUNFOHDUIURPWKHEHJLnning of 30 
WKHSURFHVVWRDYRLGIDOVHH[SHFWDWLRQVRUXQIHDVLEOHWKLQJV«´Civil servant). 31 
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Local discourses also contest Natura 2000 discourses on nature conservation which they define 1 
in terms of species and habitats. For instance, a report on the implementation of the Directive 2 
92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora defines the aim of 3 
the Natura 2000 as ³HQVXULQJ ELRGLYHUVLW\ LQ WKH (XURSHDQ WHUULWRU\ WKURXJK WKH DGRSWLRQ RI4 
measures for the conservation of natural haELWDWVDQGZLOGDQLPDOV´(Commission of the European 5 
Communities, 2004). Before 2001, environmental NGOs developed shadow lists which were used 6 
as an input for finalising the lists of designated areas to be protected under the Natura 2000 7 
(Weber & Christophersen, 2002). After 2001, environmental NGOs have shifted emphasis to the 8 
drafting of guidelines for the preparation of management plans. However, these guidelines do not 9 
necessarily integrate forest management plans for habitat conservation.  10 
To sum up, our analysis of the conflict in Sierra de Urbión uncovered a long struggle over who 11 
should be entitled to make decisions over forests between the regional administration on the one 12 
hand, and the local administrations and the villagers on this other. The struggle is rooted in the 13 
imposition of forest management plans on communally owned forests, which has weakened the 14 
role of local ordinances in forest management. Both institutions inform discursive practices that 15 
are used to gain control over forests. Over more than a century, the discourses of civil servants 16 
and villagers on forest conservation and management have become intertwined. However, a 17 
conflict persists over who has the right to make decisions. Path-dependency and institutional 18 
stickiness have reinforced the conflict and other local discourses on forest conservation have not 19 
emerged. However, discourses on forest conservation policies emphasising species, habitats and 20 
ecosystems are implemented and hegemonic discourses by their protagonists (conservationists 21 
and the regional administration) act as barriers to institutional change which would enhance local 22 
control over the forests. 23 
The collaborative planning process in the Sierra de Cabrejas 24 
In Sierra de Cabrejas, two local action groups (LAGs, associations of municipalities) promoted 25 
the development of the first management plan for a Natura 2000 site in Castile and León. The 26 
LAGs were created as mandatory local governance structures required to access EU rural 27 
development funds. They involve public and private parties working together on local 28 
development strategies and activity portfolios (Fischler, 2000). LAGs have expertise and 29 
experience to tap into resources other than the Leader (Tvrdonova, 2008) from sectors such as 30 
tourism, cultural legacy, and nature conservation. 31 
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When the rumours about possible Natura 2000 designation of Sierra de Cabrejas started 1 
circulating, a LAG raised awareness by publishing a book on the Natura 2000 sites of importance 2 
in the Soria Province and by distributing it to local administration and villagers potentially affected 3 
by the protected area. The LAGs also promoted local debates on Natura 2000 through meetings, 4 
guided tours to juniper forests, public information material, an information bulletin broadcast in 5 
local radio and public discussions. The debates focused on uncertainties such as whether funds 6 
will be available; who should be responsible for forest planning and management; and what 7 
mechanisms should be used for participation, education and information exchange.  8 
In 2003, a synthesis of these debates was presented to the representatives of the State and the 9 
EU. The executive manager RIWKH&LG¶V6RULDQ/DQG$VVRFLDWLRQasked whether a management 10 
plan based on civil society involvement would be accepted for the prospective Natura 2000 site. 11 
This was the starting point of collaboration for the development of the management plan in Sierra 12 
de Cabrejas (Campos-Fernandez & Martín-Olmos, 2006). 13 
LAGs¶ GLVFRXUVH RQ Natura 2000 as an opportunity for a participatory process emerged in the 14 
socio-economic context of forest abandonment (for more detailed description see below). The 15 
absence of economic activity in forests meant the absence of conflict in Sierra de Cabrejas. One 16 
LAG representative explained that: 17 
³1DWXUDZDVVRPHWKLQJWKDWIDLOHGKHUHZHGLGQ¶WNQRZZKDWLWZDVDQGZKDWLWZDV18 
IRU« KRZ LW ZRXOG DIIHFW XV« EXW WKH YHU\ VWUXFWXUH RI 1DWura 2000 talked about 19 
participation, although the lines were drawn in the land without mentioning it to anyone 20 
>«@ Then we started to talk to people about how they perceived the conservation of 21 
natural spaces, and we decided to move from a general perspective of Natura 2000 to a 22 
PRUHVSHFLILF VSDFH«ZH WULHG WR WDNHDGYDQWDJHRIZKDW1DWXUDFDQRIIHU«ZH23 
FKRVHDVSDFHWKDWZDVQRWYHU\FRQIOLFWLYH«EHFDXVHWKHODQGXVHWKHUHLVPLQLPDODQG24 
then we decided to act upon a space that practically nobody livHVLQ´ 25 
Sierra de Cabrejas had been suffering from rural exodus for the past several decades. For 26 
instance, in Calatañazor, one of the biggest villages in the Sierra de Cabrejas, there are only 70 27 
inhabitants left and most of them are retired (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2010).  Avioncillo, 28 
a village located in the protected area, had only 10 inhabitants in 2010 (ibid.).  29 
However, collaborative planning did not mean that there was no conflict in Sierra de Cabrejas. 30 
The Forest Owners¶ Association (FOA) opposed the Natura 2000 designation in Sierra de 31 
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Cabrejas at first with discourses about the burdens to private ownership. FOA and LAG shared 1 
the same framing of the problem but had different views on the solutions. While LAG advocated a 2 
collaborative process to develop management plans for the Natura 2000 site, FOA promoted 3 
enhanced forest management. Interviewed forest owners used economic discourses to call for 4 
improved forest management in the area:  5 
³,W LVQHFHVVDU\WRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIRXU assets and to get some money, whatever this 6 
PRQH\LVWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHODQG´ 7 
In 2010, the FOA initiated a prRMHFW FDOOHG ³0RQWHV GH 6RFLRV´ to find the successors of the 8 
original owners of the forest because under prevailing rules it was becoming impossible to 9 
manage the forest when only a minority of owners were known. The idea was to create a 10 
management board based on a legal agreement among all co-owners to facilitate decision-11 
making and management of the forest. A national newspaper (El Pais, 28 November 2011) 12 
commented on this project as follows: 13 
³Natural forests are a very emotive issue; everything that our ancestors did with so much 14 
love should be maintained to ensure their survival. And it should be very clear that there 15 
LVQRHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWWKLVLVPRUHWRSUHVHUYHZKDWRXUDQFHVWRUVGLG´ 16 
Next, we analyse how the institutional context inherited from the past relates to contemporary 17 
discourses. Sierra de Cabrejas was also affected by the State appropriation of Royal, clerical and 18 
municipal land. However, in Sierra de Cabrejas only a very limited proportion of forest was 19 
declared Public Utility Forest. The appropriated land was auctioned off but municipalities were 20 
excluded from buying their own land back. The only way for villagers to maintain access to forests 21 
was to buy it back collectively. Collective ownership prevails on 48 % of the land and private 22 
ownership accounts for another 23 % (see Figure 2). Today there are 11250 co-owners of the 23 
forest, while the villages only have 2822 inhabitants. Many original owners and their descendants 24 
have migrated elsewhere without necessarily knowing that they are legal owners of the forest. 25 
Many local inhabitants have in turn lost their ownership rights. As all co-owners need to agree on 26 
the management of the forest, forest management has become nearly impossible. 27 
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 1 
Figure 2: Structure of ownership in the Sierra de Cabrejas. Source: (CESEFOR, 2008).  2 
The average size of a parcel of forest is 3.6 hectares. Forest income is estimated to be less than 3 
12 Euros per hectare per year. The FOA considered that low productivity and the small proportion 4 
of landowners resident in the area explain the abandonment of forest (ibid). About 3% of the 5 
protected area (in grey) belongs to truffle industry. The remaining 26 % of the land consists of 6 
Public Utility Forests which have a mean plot size of 239 hectares. The Public Utility Forests are 7 
located between Sierra de Urbión and Sierra de Cabrejas, and their tree species composition is 8 
mainly pine with some oak. The only Public Utility Forest where Spanish juniper is the main tree 9 
species is in the village of Cabrejas.  10 
Juniper forests have not been traditionally object of forest management planning in the province 11 
(Lucas Santolaya, 1998), because of their slow growth of only about 0.5 m3/ha per annum. More 12 
recently, a public utility forest with Spanish juniper as the main specie has adopted innovative 13 
forest management planning to reconcile habitat conservation, provisioning of wood, grazing and 14 
game, and recreational use (Sabin & Fernández, 2006). In privately owned land, Spanish juniper 15 
is harvested without management plans or guidelines although harvesting needs a permit and in 16 
most cases a forester would choose the trees to be harvested.  17 
Here, governance system on the forests is simpler than in Public Utility forests, since most of the 18 
legal rights are devolved in private and collective owned forests (Table 2).  19 
20 
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 1 
Legal rights in private and 
collective owned forests 
Forest 
Administration 
Local 
Municipalities 
Local people or 
neighbours 
Ownership of the forests    X 
Forest management planning   X 
Forest operations   (X) 
Right to have an income from 
the forest harvesting 
X X X 
Right to organize the selling 
of the wood 
  X 
Table 2: Governance and rights in private and collective owned forests (Montes de Socios)  2 
The lack of strong forest institutions and institutional struggles for the right to decide translates to 3 
the dominance of economic discourses in the case study. Despite the low economic productivity 4 
of the forest, local counter-discourses call for compensation for limited access to forest resources.  5 
This claim is in line with international discourses on payments for carbon sequestration. Many 6 
owners argue that if their forests are carbon sinks, they must receive a payment for this service.  7 
³7KH IRUHVWV DUH JLYLQJ HQRXJK WR WKH VRFLHW\ HQRXJK WR WDNH XV LQWR DFFRXQW DUHQ¶W8 
WKH\":HDUHQRWDVNLQJIRUVXEVLGLHVZHRQO\ZDQWWKHPWRSD\IRURXUFRQWULEXWLRQ«9 
WKLVZRXOGEHWKHORJLFDOWKLQJ«´ (Forest owner) 10 
This discourse on payments for carbon sequestration is present in both cases. But in Sierra de 11 
Cabrejas, the forest is conserved because of its abandonment rather than management, 12 
weakening the argument about environmental services provided: 13 
³,IWKLVDUHDKDVEHHQSURWHFWHGLWLVIRUDUHDVRQ«LW¶VEHFDXVHLW¶VYHU\ZHOOSUHVHUYHG«14 
LWLVSUHFLVHO\DQDUHDZKHUHWKHUHLVQRDFWLYLW\«WKHUHDUHQRSHRSOHWKHUHLVQRWKLQJ´ 15 
Despite its initial opposition to Natura 2000, FOA participated actively in the collaborative 16 
planning process initiated by the LAGs. PULYDWH IRUHVW RZQHUV¶ discourses on private property 17 
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were absorbed into participatory process through the creation of a thematic area on property.  1 
In the case tKH DOLJQPHQW RI /$*V¶ GLVFRXUVH on conservation with participation became 2 
institutionalized as a practice because it was in line with emerging official EU discourses on public 3 
participation. Furthermore, small population living in the area weakened the chances of counter-4 
discourses. But although the developed Natura 2000 management plans enjoy legitimacy in the 5 
eyes of all involved actors, LAGs remain in a weak position since they are dependent on regional 6 
administration¶VDFFHSWDQFHDQGsupport. In 2012, the LAGs considered that it would be difficult to 7 
obtain any national or regional funds for further activities in the protected area due to the 8 
economic crisis in the country. One LAG member assessed the situation as follows:  i) finance is 9 
coming to an end and therefore they cannot afford the staff or consultancy payments; ii) there is 10 
no clear signal from the regional administration about the next step after the approval of the plan; 11 
and iii) there is no strong interest in the local administration to follow up the process. 12 
To conclude, abandonment of land and low forest income favoured the framing of Natura 2000 as 13 
an opportunity for involving villagers in the development of management plans for the protected 14 
area and or increasing their voice over the implementation of forest conservation policies. The 15 
new management plan would have had a chance to set a new agenda for forest conservation in 16 
the Sierra de Cabrejas. However, legal and economic contexts undermined it in the end. 17 
Discussion 18 
In Sierra de Urbión, discourses highlighting economic concerns and the right to make decisions 19 
about forests were in conflict with forest conservation. Other studies on Soria have demonstrated 20 
that forest heritage influences land tenure, land ownership and land use rights, as well as social 21 
conflicts over them (Montiel, 2007). In Sierra de Urbión, historical property rights largely explain 22 
the conflict over the designation of the Natural Park. Although the forest management discourse 23 
is shared by the villagers and the regional administration, the struggle over who is entitled to 24 
make decisions on forest remains unsettled and is at the root of the conflict.  25 
New institutional scholars have shown how common property is structured by formal and informal 26 
institutions, and how these institutions can play a role in preventing environmental degradation by 27 
sanctioning mechanisms and by enhancing communication and cooperation (Berkes, 2004; 28 
Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007; Ostrom, et al., 1994; Ostrom, 1990). Self-organized rule making 29 
partly explains why some groups govern their forests successfully (Andersson, et al., 2014).  30 
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In Sierra de Urbión, such institutions are embedded in local discourses that have shaped: i) the 1 
shared understanding of forest management among regional administration and villagers; and ii) 2 
the struggle over who should have decision-making authority on forests. Here, the historical 3 
institutional context has impacted on the implementation of forest conservation policies leading to 4 
discourses on ownership and local control. In Sierra de Urbión, path-dependency has reinforced 5 
the frame on who has the right to make decisions over forests. Raitio (2012) has similarly found 6 
that traditional forest planning involves a set of informal rules reinforcing formal rules for timber 7 
production even at the expense of other rules regarding participation.  8 
In contrast, forest conservation was framed as an opportunity in Sierra de Cabrejas and as a 9 
result a collaborative process emerged. Sierra de Cabrejas differs from Sierra de Urbión in three 10 
key respects:  In the former there is i) limited dependency on forests as most income is obtained 11 
from agriculture and rural development funds; ii) limited role of public utility forests and forest 12 
management plans; and, iii) substantial abandonment of forested land. 13 
Limited dependency on forests explains why EU rural development and nature conservation 14 
policies had a bigger influence in Sierra de Cabrejas than forest policies. Limited dependency on 15 
forests and limited role of public utility forests and forest management plans translate to fewer 16 
formal and informal forest-related rules operating at local level, and therefore to bigger 17 
permeability to rules originating from other policy areas. Collaboration in Sierra de Cabrejas was 18 
influenced by experiences gained from the implementation of European rural development 19 
programmes. The formal and informal rules adopted by the LAGs and leadership were crucial for 20 
the emergence of collaborative planning.  21 
Second, the weakening of historical forest management institutions led to openness to new 22 
discourses on forest conservation and rural development. New actors involved in forest 23 
conservation introduced new frames on species and habitats, disassociated from rules that have 24 
been part of forest policies in the past. This institutional vacuum created space for new ideas that 25 
have been been institutionalized in policy arrangements and practices (den Besten et al., 2013).  26 
Third, the abandonment of forest and the lack of dissenting views on forest use planning in Sierra 27 
the Cabrejas facilitated the adoption of other frames and the emergence of collaboration. 28 
In both cases economic discourses are accepted and shared among most actors. However, they 29 
are decoupled from conventional forest production in the Cabrejas Mountains. Instead, LAG 30 
seeks European Union funding and conservation discourses are integrated into broader 31 
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discourses of rural development policy. LAGV¶GLVFRXUVH is coherent with the on-going discourses 1 
and practices on rural development. LAG became an agent of rural change, with knowledge of 2 
EU procedures and pro-active attitude for fundraising and rural development. 3 
Finally, legalistic discourse on forest conservation prevented local discourses from achieving 4 
institutionalisation in the sense of institutional change in both cases. Regional civil servants and 5 
environmentalists have aligned positions and discourses. The State and its bureaucracy are 6 
considered responsible for the implementation of forest conservation policies The implementation 7 
of nature conservation policy in Europe has been criticized for giving little attention to local 8 
stakeholders since implementation of conservation has been based on ecological criteria rather 9 
than on local knowledge (Beunen & Vries, 2011; Buijs et al., 2011; Ferranti, et al., 2013). The 10 
legalistic interpretation of Natura 2000 has resulted in overly formal and bureaucratic translation 11 
of its directives into local management plans (Beunen & Vries, 2011) which leaves limited space 12 
for stakeholder participation (Ferranti, et al., 2010; Stoll-Kleemann, 2001). So despite the 13 
adoption of participatory policy planning in Sierra de Cabrejas, what should be protected and how 14 
is prioritised by scientific discourses over who has the right to decide on forests. 15 
Conclusions  16 
This article shows that differences in the local institutional contexts influence discursive practices 17 
and dominant discourses in the two examined cases. In Sierra de Urbión, path dependencies 18 
related to property rights and governance arrangements act as a double-edged sword: actors 19 
resisting the National Park claimed rights to manage their forest, while actors in favour of the Park 20 
confined the public debate to economic benefits and compensation. Resurgence of past 21 
institutional struggles over the forests directly challenged who has the right to decide on forests 22 
and as a result the conflict persisted. In Sierra de Cabrejas, discourse on participation enabled 23 
the framing of forest conservation policy as an opportunity. This, together with limited 24 
dependency on forests, limited role of forest institutions and depopulation, enabled the 25 
emergence of a collaborative planning process.  26 
We demonstrated how the local institutional context explains the emergence of conflict or 27 
collaborative planning. However, we also demonstrate that local counter-discourses are 28 
prevented from achieving institutional change by the legalistic and scientific discourses of 29 
regional authorities and environmental organisations.  30 
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